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Abstract
Speculative attacks tend to be temporally correlated; that is, currency crises 
appear to pass "contagiously" from one country to another. The paper provides a 
survey of the theoretical literature and analyzes the contagious nature of currency 
crises empirically. Using thirty years of panel data from twenty industrialized 
countries, we find evidence of contagion. Contagion appears to spread more 
easily to countries which are closely tied by international trade linkages than to 
countries in similar macroeconomic circumstances.
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The scope for currency crises to spill contagiously across countries has been 
hotly debated in the wake of the Mexican meltdown. A frequently cited 
justification for the S50 billion of assistance provided by the IMF, the United 
States and other G-7 governments in early 1995 was that the effects of the 
Mexican crisis, if allowed to play themselves out, would not be limited to that 
country; rather, other emerging markets would have experienced serious 
repercussions. Because the Mexican authorities had little incentive to internalize 
these externalities, multilateral intervention was justified. In support of this view 
observers cite the reserve losses, interest-rate increases and weakening exchange 
rates suffered by countries like Argentina and Thailand in the early weeks of 
1995. The contrary view is that investors were discriminating in the countries 
they attacked. Currencies other than the Mexican peso were subjected to 
relatively little pressure, and only countries with large current-account deficits, 
overvalued real rates and other weak fundamentals felt much of an effect. The 
implication is that the Mexican bailout, to the extent that it was justified by fears 
of contagion, was uncalled for.
A similar controversy arose at the time of the 1992-3 crises in the European 
Monetary System. In 1992 it was argued that the French franc and the Irish punt 
came under attack as a result of the earlier crises experienced by the British 
pound and the Italian lira. In 1993 it was argued that the attack on the French 
franc threatened to spill over to other European currencies. The implication 
drawn was that foreign support of the franc was essential to prevent chaos from 
spreading contagiously throughout the EMS. The rebuttal was that only 
European countries whose fundamentals were weak were subjected to speculative 
attacks; others like the Netherlands remained immune because they appropriately 
aligned their economic policies to the maintenance of their currency pegs. Thus, 
the argument went, only countries in particular economic and political 
circumstances were susceptible.
Clearly, the stakes for policy are immense. Ascertaining whether there exists 
contagion in foreign exchange markets - by which we mean a systematic effect on 
the probability of a speculative attack which steins from attacks on other 
currencies, and is therefore an additional effect above and beyond those of 
domestic "fundamentals" -- and under what conditions contagious currency crises 
arise should be a high priority for empirical research in open-economy 
macroeconomics. It is remarkable therefore that there exists little systematic 
analysis of the question. Our goal in this paper is to take a first step toward 
filling this gap.
We use a panel of quarterly data for 20 industrial countries for the period 
1959-1993 to test for contagious currency crises. We ask whether the probability 
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in other countries at the same time, after controlling for the effects of political and 
economic fundamentals. The evidence is striking: a variety of tests and a battery 
of sensitivity analyses uniformly suggest that a crisis elsewhere in the world 
increases the probability of a speculative attack by an economically and 
statistically significant amount (our best estimate is eight percentage points), even 
after controlling for economic and political fundamentals in the country 
concerned. This would appear to be the first systematic evidence consistent with 
the existence of contagious currency crises. However, the evidence is suggestive 
rather than definitive, since it could also result from shocks to an unmeasurable 
but common shock (e g., a shock to our center country which is not picked up by 
our control variables.)
One can think of a number of channels through which instability in foreign 
exchange markets might be transmitted across countries. One is the impact of a 
speculative attack on the current and prospective international competitiveness of 
the countries concerned and hence on their current accounts. Thus, the attack on 
the United Kingdom in September 1992 and sterling's subsequent depreciation are 
said to have damaged the international competitiveness of the Republic of 
Ireland, for which the UK is the single most important export market, and to have 
provoked the attack on the punt at the beginning of 1993. Finland's devaluation 
in August 1992 was widely regarded as having had negative repercussions for 
Sweden, not so much because of direct trade between the two countries but 
because their exporters competed in the same third markets. Attacks on Spain in 
1992-3 and the depreciation of the peseta are said to have damaged the 
international competitiveness of Portugal, which relies heavily on the Spanish 
export market, and to have provoked an attack on the escudo despite the virtual 
absence of imbalances in domestic fundamentals.
Trade links may not be the only channel of transmission, of course. It is 
difficult to argue, for example, that the Tequila Effect — the pressure applied to 
currencies in Latin America and East Asia following the crash of the Mexican 
peso in 1994 — stemmed from strong trade links between Mexico and the other 
countries concerned. Argentina and Brazil may have traded extensively with 
Mexico, but the same was not true of Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Thailand. 
Rather than focusing on trade links, commentators pointed to similarities across 
countries in macroeconomic policies and conditions.
Thus, one can imagine a second model focusing on co-movements in 
macroeconomic policies and conditions in the countries subject to attack. 
Evidence that certain market participants are skeptical about the stability of a 
currency may lead their colleagues to suspect that they also skeptical about the 
prospects for the currencies of other countries in a similar macroeconomic 
position. Difficulties in one country pursuing a program of exchange-rate-based 
stabilization, for example, might lead currency traders to revise their assessment 





























































































carry it off. An attack on one currency and the issuing government's response to 
the pressure may thus provide new information relevant for expectations of how 
other governments will respond if placed in a similar position. For example, 
evidence that a country with an unusually high unemployment rate succumbed to 
a speculative attack and abandoned its currency peg out of reluctance to raise 
interest rates if that meant further aggravating unemployment might lead investors 
to revise their expectations of the likelihood that other countries in similar 
positions would be prepared to do so.
These two interpretations emphasizing different channels of international 
transmission of currency crises have different empirical implications. The 
interpretation emphasizing trade links suggests that currency crises will spread 
contagiously among countries that trade disproportionately with one another The 
one emphasizing economic and political commonalties suggests that instability 
will instead infect countries in broadly economic and political positions.
To compare these different channels of contagion transmission, we weight 
crises elsewhere in the world by country characteristics intended to capture the 
extent to which contagion is transmitted through specific channels. We compare 
two different weighting schemes. First, on the assumption that countries which 
trade disproportionately with one another are prone to contagion operating 
through the competitiveness effects of crisis-induced exchange rate changes, we 
weight crises in neighboring countries by the importance of trade with those 
countries. Second, on the assumption that crises and governments' reactions to 
them lead investors to revise their expectations of officials' resolve in similar 
ways with respect to countries in broadly similar macroeconomic positions, we 
weight crises by the similarity of macroeconomic policies and outcomes.
The results provide further support for the hypothesis that speculative attacks 
in foreign exchange markets spread contagiously across countries. Our trade- 
weighted measure of crises elsewhere in the world is important economically as 
well as being significant statistically at high levels of confidence; it is robust to a 
variety of sensitivity tests. Our macro-weighted measure of crises does not 
display the same level of significance. Although there is always the possibility 
that our empirical measures of macroeconomic contagion are not capturing these 
phenomena adequately, we are inclined to interpret these results as suggesting 
that trade, rather than revisions of expectations based on macroeconomic factors, 
has been the dominant channel of transmission for contagious currency crises for 
the bulk of the sample period.
Importantly, the trade- and macro-weighted specifications both outperform 
the naive model of contagion when they are included one at a time in alternative 
specifications. This supports the interpretation of our results in terms of 
contagion rather than omitted environmental variables. It is nevertheless 
appropriate to err on the side of caution, especially since our unweighted measure 
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The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section II provides an 
overview of the theoretical literature on speculative attacks in foreign exchange 
markets, with special reference to contagion. Section III reviews related 
empirical studies. In Section IV we present new evidence on contagion, while 
section V analyzes various channels of transmission for the contagion effect 
Section VI concludes.
II. Theories of Speculative Attacks, Contagious and Otherwise
In this section we review the theoretical literature on speculative attacks in 
foreign exchange markets, starting with the seminal Krugman (1979) model, 
proceeding to models of multiple equilibria, and concluding with models of 
contagious currency crises.1
A. Speculative Attacks
Krugman's contribution was to show how inconsistencies between domestic 
economic conditions and an exchange rate commitment leads to the collapse of 
the currency peg. In his model, the overly expansionary stance of domestic 
policy causes domestic absorption to exceed production. The difference spills 
over into a balance-of-payments deficit, which the central bank finances by 
expending reserves. Eventually reserves fall to a critical threshold at which a 
speculative attack is launched, eliminating the authorities' remaining foreign 
assets. Once reserves are depleted, the exchange rate peg is abandoned, and the 
currency depreciates secularly over time, reflecting the more expansionary stance 
of policy at home than abroad.
This theory of balance of payments crises has produced four classes of 
insights. First, it helps to identify the relevant fundamentals. Most obviously, 
these should include macroeconomic determinants of the exchange rate and the 
balance of payments, as embodied in aggregate models of exchange rate 
determination and the literature on the monetary approach to the balance of 
payments. Given the forward-looking nature of these models, this list of 
determinants will necessarily include expected future values of the relevant 
series.1 2 At the same time, the poor empirical performance of these models gives 
grounds for concern about the success with which speculative-attack models 
building on these foundations can be implemented empirically; we revisit this 
point below.
Second, the Krugman model demonstrates how crises can erupt before 
official reserves, which decline secularly over time, actually hit zero. Currency 
speculation takes the form of purchases and sales of domestic currency for
1 A recent survey is Blackburn and Sola (1993).
2 That expected future fundamentals can themselves depend on whether a speculative attack 




























































































foreign assets. Those transactions arise as traders exchange assets among 
themselves so as to equalize rates of return and, more generally, to balance their 
portfolios, trading off risk and return. They provoke a crisis when no one in the 
market is willing to acquire domestic currency at the prevailing price (given by 
the pegged rate of exchange). Under these circumstances, the only counterpart 
on the short side of the market is the central bank. Speculators have an incentive 
to liquidate their holdings of domestic currency while the central bank retains 
sufficient reserves to absorb the volume of sales. The timing of the attack is 
determined such that its magnitude just suffices to eliminate the central bank's 
entire stock of reserves.
A third implication of the basic model is that the central bank can only 
maintain a currency peg if it possesses adequate foreign exchange reserves. Once 
their reserves have been lost in the attack, the authorities have no choice but to 
abandon the peg. In the standard model, crises thus result in a transition to 
floating. The model thus implies that reserve stocks must be reconstituted before 
the exchange rate can be re-pegged. The standard formulation also helps us think 
about the meaning of "reserve adequacy." To defend the currency peg, the 
central bank must be capable of purchasing all of its liabilities that are put up for 
sale by other agents. In the standard model, the volume of sales is small: it 
corresponds to the decline in monetary base needed to ratify the fall in money 
demand associated with the higher interest rates that prevail following the shift 
from a pegged to a depreciating exchange rate. Normally, domestic residents 
continue to hold a significant proportion of the base following the collapse of the 
peg, since they need it for transactions purposes. But in highly dollarized 
economies, the transactions demand for domestic currency can be very small, as 
pointed out by, inter alia, Edwards (1989); in this case, the share of the monetary 
base subject to liquidation in a crisis may be quite large. More worrisome still is 
the possibility that the monetary authorities will also be required to purchase 
other domestic liabilities (i.e., M2) if the currency crisis provokes a banking 
crisis.3
A fourth implication of the standard model is that the authorities have little 
chance of fending off an attack. Even if the volume of speculative sales of 
domestic currency is less than the monetary base, the base still exceeds the net 
stock of foreign reserves of the central bank (except in very special circumstances 
like a fully-backed currency board). In principle, the authorities can augment 
their gross reserves by borrowing abroad, possibly to the point where reserves 
exceed the base. But if borrowed reserves are used to finance sterilized 
intervention, the monetary base increases pari passu, and there is no level of gross 
reserves sufficient to repel an attack. If the authorities do not sterilize, then the 1
1 The link between financial and exchange crises is emphasized by Goldfajn and Valdes (1995), 
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attack can be repelled, but only at the cost of allowing the base to shrink and 
interest rates to rise. If a sizable proportion of the base is involved, the resulting 
interest rate increases may be so large that the exchange rate crisis precipitates a 
banking crisis. To avert the latter, the central bank may then have to resume 
sterilizing its intervention, which will again undermine its capacity to defend the 
currency peg.
B. Multiple Equilibria
A generic feature of theoretical macroeconomic models with rational expectations 
is that such models typically have multiple solutions. Since most of these solution 
paths do not converge to a steady state, standard practice for many years was to 
assume away divergent solutions by invoking transversality conditions. More 
recently however this non-uniqueness property - which allows for multiple 
equilibria -- has become the basis for a literature on speculative bubbles and sun­
spot equilibria. Obstfeld (1986, 1995), following a suggestion by Flood and 
Garber (1984b), has provided examples of multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling 
attacks in foreign exchange markets. These offer a wholly new perspective on 
the causes of currency crises.
The possibility of multiple equilibria arises when market participants, while 
not questioning that current policy is compatible with the indefinite maintenance 
of the currency peg, anticipate that a successful attack will alter policy. In these 
circumstances, it is expected future fundamentals, conditional on an attack taking 
place, rather than current fundamentals and expected future fundamentals absent 
an attack, which are incompatible with the peg. Two equilibria thus exist: the 
first one features no attack, no change in fundamentals, and indefinite 
maintenance of the peg; the second one features a speculative attack followed by 
a change in fundamentals which validates, ex post, the exchange-rate change that 
speculators expected to take place.
In Obstfeld (1986), pre- and post-crisis policies are set arbitrarily. If an 
attack occurs, the government is simply assumed to shift policy in a more 
expansionary direction. The arbitrary nature of this contingent policy process is 
the obvious limitation of the model. Subsequently, Bensaid and Jeanne (1993), 
Ozkan and Sutherland (1995) and Obstfeld (1995) have proposed models of 
optimizing governments which find it in their self interest to follow the kind of 
contingent policy processes that can give rise to multiple equilibria and self- 
fulfilling attacks. Their analyses build on the literature on exchange rate escape 
clauses (Obstfeld, 1991; De Kock and Grilli, 1994; Drazen and Masson, 1994), 
in which it is optimal to maintain the currency peg under some circumstances and 
to abandon it under others.
In these models, the behavior of governments still derives from special utility 
functions. In this sense, the literature on multiple equilibria and self-fulfilling 





























































































special cases. This point is emphasized by Krugman (1996), who establishes two 
further results. First, he suggests that multiple equilibria are, paradoxically, less 
likely when the fundamentals are wrong. When fundamentals are clearly 
inconsistent with the prevailing currency peg, investors have little doubt that a 
crisis will ultimately occur, and the model quickly converges to the equilibrium in 
which the currency is attacked and devalued; only when fundamentals are "good 
enough" that there remains uncertainty about whether a crisis will eventually 
result do there exist multiple equilibria. Second, Krugman shows that if the 
public does not know the authorities preferences, there may be "testing" by the 
markets -- that is, one may observe attacks that are unsuccessful but which reveal 
information about the preferences of the authorities.4
Models of self-fulfilling attacks imply that "good" fundamentals may not 
suffice to avert currency crises. To prevent an attack unjustified by fundamentals, 
the credibility of the central bank must be such that markets rule out a relaxation 
of policy once the peg is abandoned. Obstfeld (1986) provides such an example: 
there, the expectation that the central bank will react to a crisis by implementing a 
policy which implies an exchange rate appreciation eliminates the risk of a self- 
fulfilling crisis.
C. Contagion
Relatively little theoretical work has analyzed the conditions under which 
currency crises can spread contagiously across countries, though there has been 
some work of relevance. For instance, Willman (1988) and Goldberg (1993) 
endogenized relative prices, allowing events abroad to influence the real 
exchange rate and domestic competitiveness. Flood and Garber (1984a) and 
Claessens (1991) introduced uncertainty about the domestic policy process. 
Flood and Garber, followed by Obstfeld (1986), added the idea of a contingent 
policy process, in which one-time events could lead the authorities to substitute 
one policy for another, thereby introducing the possibility of self-fulfilling 
speculative attacks.
Perhaps the first systematic theoretical treatment of this question was Gerlach 
and Smets (1995). Inspired by the links between the fall of the Finnish Markka in 
1992 and the subsequent attack on the Swedish Krona, they consider two 
countries linked together by trade in merchandise and financial assets. In their 
model, a successful attack on one exchange rate leads to its real depreciation, 
which enhances the competitiveness of the country's merchandise exports. This 
produces a trade deficit in the second country, a gradual decline in the 
international reserves of its central bank, and ultimately an attack on its currency. 
A second channel for contagious transmission is the impact of crisis and
4 While testing is not, strictly speaking, a case of self-fulfilling attacks, since markets 
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depreciation in the first country on the import prices and the overall price level in 
the second. Post-crisis real depreciation in the first country reduces import prices 
in the second. In turn, this reduces its consumer price index and the demand for 
money by its residents. Their efforts to swap domestic currency for foreign 
exchange then deplete the foreign reserves of the central bank. This may shift the 
second economy from a no-attack equilibrium, in which reserves more than 
suffice to absorb the volume of prospective speculative sales and in which there 
consequently exist no grounds for a speculative attack, to a second equilibrium in 
which an attack can succeed and in which speculators thus have an incentive to 
launch it.3
Buiter et al. (1996) use an escape-clause model of exchange rate policy to 
analyze the spread of currency crises in a system of N+l countries, N of which 
(denoted the "periphery") peg to the remaining country (the "center"). The center 
is more risk averse that the others and is hence unwilling to pursue a cooperative 
monetary policy designed to stabilize exchange rates. A negative shock to the 
center which leads it to raise interest rates then induces the members of the 
periphery to reconsider their currency-pegging policy. If the members of the 
periphery cooperate, they may find it collectively optimal to leave the system — 
an extreme case of contagion. More generally, some subset of peripheral 
countries — those with the least tolerance for high interest rates — will find it 
optimal to leave the system under these circumstances, and contagion will be 
limited to this subset. Importantly, however, their decision to leave stabilizes the 
currency pegs of the remaining members of the system, because monetary 
expansion and currency depreciation by some members of the periphery provides 
an incentive for the center country, which now finds itself with an increasingly 
overvalued exchange rate, to relax its monetary stance, relieving the pressure on 
rest of the periphery. In this model, contagion is selective: the shock to the center 
spills over negatively to some members of the periphery but positively to others.
Another paper providing an analysis of contagious currency crises is Goldfajn 
and Valdes (1995). They focus on the role of illiquidity in financial markets. A 
key feature of their model is the introduction of financial intermediaries. These 
authors show how, in the presence of such intermediaries, small disturbances can 
provoke large-scale runs on a currency. Intermediaries supply liquid assets to 5
5 A similar argument is developed by Andersen (1994), building on escape-clause models of 
exchange-rate policy. In his model, the government is prompted to abandon its currency peg 
by a shock coming from outside the currency market. An exogenous deterioration in domestic 
competitiveness which increases domestic unemployment, for example, may give the 
authorities an incentive to opt for a more expansionary policy which reduced unemployment 
through surprise inflation. Andersen argues that his model provides a plausible description of 
exchange rate policy in Northern Europe in 1991-92, when the collapse of Soviet trade with 
the Nordic countries first aggravated unemployment in Finland, leading its government to 
adopt a more expansionary policy which required abandoning the currency peg, and which then 





























































































foreigners unwilling to commit to long-term investments, that is, they provide 
maturity-transformation services. By offering attractive terms on liquid deposits, 
their presence augments the volume of capital inflows. But when, for exogenous 
reasons, foreign investors withdraw their deposits, intermediaries unable to 
costlessly liquidate their assets face the risk of failure. Hence, a bank run can 
produce a self-fulfilling banking crisis (Diamond and Dibvig, 1983), in the same 
way that a run on the currency can provoke a self-fulfilling exchange-rate crisis. 
Moreover, the run on intennediaries can spill over into a run on the currency as 
foreign investors withdraw their deposits and convert them into foreign exchange. 
These crises can spread contagiously to other countries when international 
investors encountering liquidity difficulties as a result of the banking crisis in one 
country respond by liquidating their positions in other national markets.
A related literature concerned with information, while not directly concerned 
with contagion in foreign exchange markets, provides a complementary approach 
to the issue. Shiller (1995) provides a model in which financial market 
participants share access to much of the same information (e g. that which 
appears on Reuters screens) but interpret and process it in different ways. What 
they make of their shared information depends on their own experience, which in 
turn is shaped by local conditions which only they experience. Consequently, one 
market's reaction to a piece of new information can provide a signal about its 
global implications. It may suggest to traders in other markets how they too 
should react. The fact that one market draws dramatic conclusions from a some 
information may overcome local culture in other markets and lead to a revision of 
expectations (an "information cascade"). In the present context, one can see how 
this effect could lead to an attack on one exchange rate to prompt traders in other 
currency markets to attack those exchange rates as well.
A similar analysis, also based on informational issues, is Caplin and Leahy 
(1995). In their model, financial market participants expect a crisis but have 
diffuse priors over its timing. It is costly for traders to take a position in advance 
of a crisis, in other words to move too early. Each trader is unsure whether 
others share his or her belief that a crisis will eventually occur. They exchange 
"cheap talk" amongst themselves but draw inferences only from positions taken in 
the market. The result is normal market conditions ("business as usual") with no 
hint of crisis until it suddenly erupts. Once it occurs, however, market 
participants all claim that they knew that the crisis was about to happen and that 
they were readying themselves for the eventuality (they display "wisdom after the 
fact"). This model can give rise to contagion insofar as a crisis somewhere in the 
world confirms individually-held suspicions in other markets.6
6 An illustrative application of this model would be to the ERM crises of 1992-93, The story 
would go as follows. There was a widespread belief at the time that the ERM could not 
continue to operate indefinitely without a realignment And yet its extraordinary stability since 
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III. Empirical Studies o f Speculative Attacks, Contagious and Otherwise
While the literature on crises in foreign exchange markets is replete with models 
that highlight motives for and dynamics of speculative attacks, the process of 
systematically testing the predictions of those theories has barely begun. We put 
the emphasis in this last sentence on the word "systematically." Otherwise 
convincing studies of currency crises frequently assemble evidence from biased 
samples of episodes. It is not just that they consider a selective sample of 
episodes in which currency pegs collapsed without confirming that the collapses 
they analyze are representative of the underlying population. It is that episodes in 
which pegs were abandoned are themselves unrepresentative of the population of 
speculative attacks. Some pegs are abandoned without a speculative attack. 
Others are repelled. Thus, studies like Dombusch, Goldfajn and Valdes (1995) 
and Krugman (1996), while informative about the characteristics of the episodes 
they consider, do not provide a representative characterization of speculative 
attacks.
In Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994, 1995) we attempt to analyze 
currency crises systematically by constructing a measure of speculative attacks 
that excludes devaluations and flotations not taken in a climate of crisis and 
includes unsuccessful attacks. We compare these with actual devaluations and 
other changes in exchange rate arrangements. Our measure of crises is a 
weighted average of changes in the exchange rate, changes in international 
reserves which can be paid out in response to speculative pressure, and changes 
in the interest differential since interest rates can be raised to fend off an attack. 
(A more detailed description of the methodology is presented below.) We analyze 
the experience of some two dozen OECD economies since 1959.
Our findings on the causes and consequences of devaluations and 
revaluations are consistent with the predictions of mainstream models. Countries 
which devalue experience problems of external balance in the period leading up 
to the event. Their trade deficits and reserve losses are associated with relatively 
expansionary monetary policies. In addition, the period leading up to 
devaluations is characterized by problems of internal balance as reflected in 
relatively high levels of unemployment; the expansionary monetary stance in 
these countries may be adopted partly in response to these domestic concerns. 
Broadly speaking, revaluations are mirror images of devaluations.7 Other events
further realignments. Extraneous circumstances (the political difficulties of ratifying the 
Maastricht Treaty) then triggered a crisis (which culminated in the devaluation of the Italian 
lira) which put paid to this belief. It revealed to all traders that what they privately believed all 
along was true— that realignments were still necessary.
7 This evidence is consistent with models emphasizing the domestic determinants of external 





























































































in foreign exchange markets, in contrast, resist generalization. For example, 
transitions between exchange rate regimes (like movements from fixed to floating 
rates) are largely unpredictable.
We find that countries susceptible to crises are those whose governments 
have pursued accommodating monetary policies leading to high inflation and 
reserve losses, generally in response to deteriorating conditions on the 
unemployment front. Initially, the current account moves into deficit, and the 
capital account worsens as the crisis nears. Countries which take last-minute 
steps to defend the currency by significantly reducing the rate of money growth 
sometimes succeed in defending the rate. Those which retrench less dramatically 
may still be forced to capitulate but often do so without provoking a major crisis. 
In contrast, governments which rely on sterilized intervention to the exclusion of 
more fundamental policy adjustments are generally unable to avoid full-blown 
currency crises.
A few other studies have adopted this approach. For example, Moreno 
(1995) analyzes crises in the Pacific Basin economies from 1980 through 1994. 
He finds that periods of speculative pressure tend to be associated with large 
budget deficits and rapid rates of growth of domestic credit. There is some 
evidence that episodes of pressure arise when slow growth and relatively high 
inflation make it difficult for the government to maintain a stable exchange rate. 
In contrast, there is no evidence that indicators of external balance differ between 
crises and tranquil periods.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) consider speculative attacks on currencies and 
banking crises, analyzing connections between the two. They focus on 20 
countries in Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East that experienced 
banking difficulties in the period 1970-1995. Their index of currency crises is 
constructed as a weighted average of exchange rate changes and reserve changes 
(because the relevant interest rate data are lacking for some countries). In their 
sample, crises tend to be preceded by declining economic activity, weakening 
export sectors, falling stock markets, and high real interest rates. In addition, 
crises are preceded by accelerating money growth and rapid rates of growth of 
the liabilities of the banking system. Banking crises are leading indicators of 
currency crises, but there are few instances where currency crises predict banking 
crises.
By comparison, empirical analyses of contagion are few. Typical of the 
literature are studies which provide informal comparisons of small groups of 
countries. Burki and Edwards (1995) contrast the experiences of Argentina, 
Brazil and Venezuela in the wake of the Mexican crisis with those of Chile and 
Colombia, suggesting that contagion, while present, was selective. Calvo (1996)
governments concerned with internal balance and constrained by the exchange rate in their 
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provides a series of comparisons between Mexico and other countries in an effort 
to understand why some countries were more susceptible than others to the 
tequila effect.
We are aware of three statistical studies of contagion. Calvo and Reinhart 
(1995) report evidence of contagion in an econometric model in which capital 
flows to four small Latin American countries depend on their standard 
determinants but also on a contagion proxy, namely, capital flows to four large 
Latin American countries. Their results can be questioned, however, on the 
grounds that the flow of capital to neighboring countries is a less-than-ideal proxy 
for contagion and that the sample of countries is not random.
Schmukler and Frankel (1996) model contagion using data on closed-end 
country funds. Although their dependent variable, the level of stock prices, is 
different from the one with which we are concerned, the two are linked insofar as 
the rise in domestic interest rates needed to fend off an attack on the currency will 
tend to depress equity prices. Their evidence suggests that investors 
differentiated among countries to a greater extent after the 1994 Mexican crisis 
than after its 1982 predecessor. In the short run, a drop in Mexican prices tends 
to induce sell-offs in other markets motivated by the desire to raise cash; while 
there is evidence of contagion in Latin America in the long run as well, the long- 
run effect of a Mexican sell-off on Asian markets is positive.8
Sachs, Tomell and Velasco (1996) analyzed the period immediately after the 
crash of the Mexican peso in December 1994 and found that the countries hit by 
the "Tequila Effect" had experienced lending booms, over-valued real exchange 
rates, and low reserves. But their sample is far from random (both in terms of 
time and country choice); in addition, they do not distinguish between attacks 
which are unwarranted by fundamentals but are triggered by macroeconomic 
similarity, and attacks warranted by macroeconomc factors.
IV. Analyzing Contagion Systematically
In this section, we test for the existence of "contagious" currency crises. The 
contagion effect with which we are concerned can be thought of as an increase in 
the probability of a speculative attack on the domestic currency which stems not
8 In a similar exercise, Valdes (1996) analyzes the secondary market prices of sovereign debt, 
and shows that there exists a strong cross-country correlation of these prices even after 
controlling for macroeconomic fundamentals and "big news events" such as announcements of 
Brady Plan restructurings. This evidence of "contagion" in the markets for developing-country 
debt is much stronger than analogous evidence for the U S. corporate bond market, where 
fundamentals explain essentially all of the observed correlation across issues, and than in a 
group of medium-sized OECD countries, where fundamentals again explain all of the observed 





























































































from domestic "fundamentals" such as money and output but from the existence 
of a (not necessarily successful) speculative attack elsewhere in the world
We analyze a panel of quarterly macroeconomic and political data covering 
twenty industrial countries from 1959 through 1993 (a total of 2800 
observations). We pose the following question: is the incidence of a currency 
crisis in a particular country at a given point in time (e g., France in the third 
quarter of 1992) correlated with the incidence of a currency crisis in a different 
country (e g., the United Kingdom) at the same point in time, even after taking 
into account the effects of current and lagged domestic macroeconomic and 
political influences? The finding of a strong positive partial correlation is 
consistent with the existence of contagion, since it implies that speculative attacks 
are temporally correlated even after conditioning on domestic factors. Still, it is 
difficult to interpret this as definitive proof of contagion, since it may in fact 
reflect not contagion but an unmeasured common shock to economic 
fundamentals which strikes a number of counties simultaneously (e.g., from 
Germany, our center country), rather than actual spillovers from one country to 
another. For this reason, in the next section we model alternative channels of 
transmission of this contagion effect.
A. Measuring Currency Crises
The first issue that must be confronted is how to determine when a speculative 
attack has occurred. Having addressed this issue in a number of previous papers 
(Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1994, 1995)), we provide only a summary of 
our thinking here.
Currency crises cannot be identified with actual devaluations, revaluations 
and instances in which the currency is floated, for two reasons.9 First, not all 
speculative attacks are successful. The currency may be supported through the 
expenditure of reserves by the central bank or by foreign central banks and 
governments.10 1 Alternatively, the authorities may repel attacks by raising interest 
rates and adopting other policies of austerity. Further, many realignments are 
taken deliberately in tranquil periods, possibly to preclude future attacks.
Ideally, an index of speculative pressure would be obtained by employing a 
structural model of exchange rate determination, from which one would derive 
the excess demand for foreign exchange. In practice, however, empirical models 
linking macroeconomic variables to the exchange rate have little explanatory 
power at short and intermediate horizons." In the absence of an empirically valid 
macro-model, we resort to an ad hoc approach, the underlying intuition for which 
is derived from the well-known model of exchange market pressure due to Girton
9 We refer to such actual changes in explicit exchange rate policy as "events" and think of them 
as overlapping in part with the currency crises that we are interested in
10 And occasionally by the actual or threatened imposition of capital controls
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and Roper (1977). The idea is that an excess demand for foreign exchange can 
be met through several (not mutually exclusive) channels. If the attack is 
successful, depreciation or devaluation occurs. But the monetary authorities may 
instead accommodate the pressure by running down their international reserves or 
deter the attack by raising interest rates. As a measure of speculative pressure, 
we therefore construct a weighted average of exchange rate changes, reserve 
changes, and interest rate changes. All of these variables are measured relative to 
those prevailing in Germany, the reference country Germany is a logical choice 
for a center country, since it has had a strong currency throughout the post-war 
era, and has been a critical member of all important OECD fixed exchange rate 
systems (including the Bretton Woods system, the EMS, and the "snake" 
preceding the EMS).12
Our index of exchange market pressure is:
EMPi,t0 [(a %Dei,t) + (bD(ii,t - iG,t)) - (g(%Dn,t - %DrG,t))],
where: ei,t denotes the price of a DM in i's currency at time t; iG denotes the 
short German interest; r denotes the ratio of international reserves;13 and a, b, and 
g are weights.
We define crises as extreme values of this index:
Crisisi,t = 1 if EMPi,t > 1.5sEMP + m EMP
= 0 otherwise,
where: m EMP and sEMP are the sample mean and standard deviation of 
EMP respectively.
A critical step is weighting the three components of the index. An obvious 
option is an unweighted average, which has the advantage of simplicity. But 
since the volatility of reserves, exchange rates and interest differential is very 
different, we instead weight the components so as to equalize the volatilities of 
the three components, thereby preventing any one of them from dominating the 
index. Below we then check the sensitivity of our results to this scheme.
We identify quarters in which our index of speculative pressure is at least one 
and a half standard deviations above the sample mean as instances of speculative 
attacks (although we again test for sensitivity with respect to this arbitrarily- 
chosen threshold). To avoid counting the same crisis more than once, we exclude 
the later observation(s) when two (or more) crises occur in successive quarters. 
Thus, our "exclusion window" is one quarter (though again we vary this
12 Of course, idiosyncratic German shocks then acquire disproportionate importance. 
However, German Unification is typically considered to be the only important such shock; and 
our sensitivity analysis indicates that our results do not stem from this event.





























































































parameter). We refer to our non-crisis observations as "tranquil" periods and use 
these as the control group.14
Our choice of a one quarter exclusion window (so that each country 
contributes no more than two observations annually) and a 1.5 standard deviation 
outlier threshold produce a sample of 77 crises and 1179 periods of tranquillity .15 16
The crisis observations are not randomly distributed. There are clusters of 
speculative attacks in 1973 (at the time of the breakup of the Bretton Woods 
system) and in 1992 (at the time of the European currency crises), separated by 
long periods of tranquillity. A time-series plot of the number of crises in each 
quarter is provided as Figure 1.
B. The Data
Most of the financial and macroeconomic variables are taken from the CD-ROM 
version of the International Monetary Fund's International Financial Statistics 
(IFS). The data set is quarterly, spanning 1959 through 1993 for twenty industrial 
countries.1'’ It has been checked for transcription and other errors and corrected 
Most of the variables are transformed into differential percentage changes by 
taking differences between domestic and German annualized fourth-differences of 
natural logarithms and multiplying by a hundred.
We employ the following variables: total non-gold international reserves (IFS 
line lid); period-average exchange rates (line rf); short-term interest rates (money 
market rates [line 60b] where possible, discount rates otherwise [line 60]); 
exports and imports (both measured in dollars, lines 70d and 71 d respectively); 
the current account (line 77a.d, converted to domestic currency) and the central 
government budget position (line 80), both measured as percentages of nominal 
GDP (frequently line 99a); long-term government bond yields (line 61); a nominal 
stock market index (line 62, which sets 1990=100); domestic credit (line 32); Ml 
(line 34); M2 (line 35+ Ml); the CPI (line 64); and real GDP (usually line 99a.r). 
We also use the real effective exchange rate as a measure of competitiveness (line 
reu, which uses normalized relative unit labor costs), though this variable is only 
available from 1975.
We also utilize a number of labor market indicators not included in IFS. Data 
on total employment, the unemployment rate, and the business sector wage rate
14 Just as we do not allow crises in successive quarters to count as independent observations by 
excluding the latter, we also do not allow two successive periods of tranquillity to count as 
independent observations. We do this by applying our exclusion window to periods of both 
crisis and tranquillity.
15 However, missing data will preclude use of some of these observations; thus our panel is 
technically unbalanced.
16 The countries in our sample include (in order of IMF country number): the USA, UK, 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
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were drawn from the OECD's Main Economic Indicators To capture political 
conditions we construct indicators of governmental electoral victories and 
defeats, using Keesing's Record of World Events and Banks' Political Handbook 
of the World.
Finally, we use a list of exchange market "events" (devaluations, flotations, 
changes in exchange rate band widths and so forth). These are gleaned from the 
IMF's annual report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 
These volumes also provide us the basis for constructing with dummy variables 
indicating the presence of capital controls.
The available data on international reserves are less than ideal for a number of 
well-known reasons. Off-balance sheet transactions, third-party intervention, 
stand-by credits, and foreign liabilities, all of which are relevant for foreign 
exchange intervention, tend to be omitted or incompletely reported. In addition, 
short-duration attacks (especially unsuccessful ones) may not be evident in 
quarterly data. Finally, subtle changes in actual or anticipated capital controls, 
while difficult to measure, may in fact be quite important, especially when 
countries are mounting defenses against speculative attacks.
C. Statistical Analysis
We can now test for the existence of contagion. We test the null hypothesis that 
the incidence of currency crises elsewhere in the world at the same point in time 
does not affect the probability of a speculative attack on the domestic currency. 
While our model attempts to control for the influence of a wide range of current 
and lagged macroeconomic variables, it is non-structural. This is one reason for 
viewing our evidence (which turns out to be inconsistent with the null at standard 
confidence levels) as consistent with, but not definitive proof of, contagion.
We estimate a binary probit model, linking our dependent variable (an 
indicator variable which takes on a value of unity for a speculative attack and 
zero otherwise) to our controls with maximum likelihood, including additional 
regressors to capture the effects of macroeconomic and political influences which 
affect crisis incidence. We cast our net as widely as possible, including: 1) the 
presence of capital controls; 2) electoral victory or defeat of the government; 3) 
the growth of domestic credit; 4) inflation; 5) output growth; 6) employment 
growth; 7) the unemployment rate; 8) the central government budget surplus (+) 
or deficit (-), expressed as a percentage of GDP; and 9) the current account 
surplus/deficit (again, a percentage of GDP). All these variables are included as 
deviations from German values.
Since the literature on currency crises does not provide much guidance about 
the time horizon for these influences, we consider a range of plausible 
alternatives. At the short end of the spectrum, we allow only contemporary 
influences to affect the probability of a crisis. We then allow for explanatory 





























































































lagged influences to operate jointly with the contemporaneous variables or by 
themselves (as would be appropriate if lags in data collection or processing 
preclude the consideration of contemporaneous developments). To conserve 
degrees of freedom, we model the lags using moving averages. Rather than 
including the first and second lags of inflation separately, for example, we include 
only a single term which is the average inflation differential in the two preceding 
quarters.
This leads us to estimate the following model:
Crisisi,t = wD(Crisisj,t) + H(L)i,t + ei,t where
D(Crisisj,t) = 1 if Crisisj,t = 1, for any j 1 i
= 0 otherwise,
where: I(L)i,t is an information set of ten contemporaneous and/or lagged 
control regressors; 1 is the corresponding vector of nuisance coefficients; and e is 
a normally distributed disturbance representing a host of omitted influences which 
affect the probability of a currency crisis.
The null of interest is Ho: w=0. We interpret evidence of the null as being 
inconsistent with a contagion effect.
D. Results
Benchmark results are presented in Table I. Its five columns correspond to five 
assumptions about the appropriate time horizon for the regressors. Since probit 
coefficients are not easily interpretable, we report the effects of one-unit 
(percentage point) changes in the regressors on the probability of a crisis (also 
expressed in percentage points), evaluated at the mean of the data. We tabulate 
the associated z-statistics, which test the null of no effect. Statistics which are 
inconsistent with the null at the five per cent level are printed in bold. 
Diagnostics are reported at the foot of the table, including a test for the joint 
significance of all the coefficients.
The results are consistent with the existence of a contagion effect which is 
economically important and statistically significant. A speculative attack 
elsewhere in the world is associated with an increased probability of a domestic 
currency crisis of around eight percentage points.
The impact of the other regressors is not dramatic, though a few effects are 
worth noting. For example, higher inflation and unemployment are associated 
with increases in the odds of an attack. Generally speaking, however, the 
absence of robust partial correlations provides grounds for caution against over­
interpreting the results.
Sensitivity analysis is reported in Table II. We consider six perturbations of 
our basic model. First, we change the definition of a speculative attack by raising 
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deviations (from one and a half) and by widening the exclusion band width to two 
quarters (from one). This marginally increases the magnitude of the contagion 
variable, although the change is not statistically significant. Second, we change 
the definition of a speculative attack by doubling the weight on actual exchange 
rate changes in our tripartite index. This has no discernible impact on the 
coefficient on the contagion variable. Third, we drop post-1978 data so as to 
focus on pre-EMS period. This increases the magnitude of the contagion 
coefficient further. Fourth, we limit the sample to EMS observations; here we get 
strikingly large contagion effects, with slope derivatives almost three times the 
size of the benchmark result in the first column of Table I. Fifth, we employ only 
observations where capital controls are present. Here, the coefficient on the 
contagion variable is indistinguishable from the benchmark result. Finally, we 
substitute for crises elsewhere in the world exchange market , actual "events" 
elsewhere in the world (e.g., actual devaluations or transitions to floating rates), a 
perturbation which leaves the baseline results relatively unaffected.
Our sensitivity tests confirm a key finding of this paper. Namely, a 
speculative attack elsewhere in the world seems to be significantly increase the 
odds of an attack on the domestic currency. But they do not allow us to 
distinguish among the various theories of contagion. For example, the relatively 
large contagion coefficient for the EMS sub-sample and the fact that "events” 
matter as much as crises point to the operation of the competitiveness channel 
modeled by Gerlach and Smets (1995) and Andersen (1994). But these results 
are also compatible with theories that emphasize the information-coordination 
effect of exchange market events.
We have also performed a number of further robustness checks that are not 
reported here. These include adding a lagged contagion term, which represents 
the incidence of a currency crisis (in a different country) in the preceding quarter 
(as opposed to contemporaneously); adding cross products of the contagion term 
and the remaining regressors; adding money growth, long interest rates, wages, 
exports and imports to the standard set of explanatory variables; using Huber- 
White covariance estimators instead of standard ones; and separating out the 
effects of contemporaneous and lagged regressors. Again, none of these tests 
disturbs our central finding that speculative attacks in other countries significantly 
increase the odds of a currency crisis.17
17 One of the few indications of sensitivity stems from the inclusion of year-specific controls; 
this results in point-estimates of w of around 4%, and correspondingly marginally statistical 
evidence against the hypothesis Ho: w=0. Since contagion would result in the clustering of 
speculative attacks over time which could be well picked up by time-specific fixed effects, it is 
hard to interpret this result. Also, controlling for the IMF's real effective exchange rate 
(computed using relative normalized unit-value costs) reduces both the sample size since the 
series is only available from 1975 and the magnitude of w by around a half. The estimate of w 





























































































A limitation of this approach is that it does not allow us to distinguish the 
effects of crises in neighboring countries (contagion per se) and from the effects 
of global shocks (unobserved environmental factors). This situation is familiar to 
epidemiologists, for whom the problem is one of determining whether the spread 
of a virus reflects the contagious nature of the germ or the disease-conducive 
nature of the environment. Thus, our results could be the result of shocks to an 
unmeasured common (German?) fundamental and are therefore not definitive. 
We need therefore to place additional structure on the problem, and proceed to do 
so in the next section.
V Channels o f Transmission for Contagion
Having established prima facie evidence of contagion, we now explore two 
alternative channels of transmission for this effect.
A. Methodology
We begin by extending our estimation model slightly to:
Crisisi,t = wWij,t(Crisisj,t) + H(L)i,t + ei,t 
Wij,t(Crisisj,t) = wij,t if Crisisj,t = 1, for any j 1 i 
= 0 otherwise,
where: wij,t is a weight which corresponds to the "relevance" at time t of 
country j for country i. The null hypothesis of interest to us is Ho: w=0. We 
interpret evidence against the null as being consistent with the existence of a 
contagion effect.18
Our first weighting scheme quantifies the ties between countries i and j using 
trade data. We use the (MERM) weights that the International Monetary Fund 
has computed in the course of constructing its real multilateral effective exchange 
rates.19 The IMF’s methodology derives the weight for j in country i's effective 
exchange rate as a convex combination of bilateral import weights and double 
export weights, using trade in manufacturing. The weights use unit labor costs, 
which are widely considered to be reliable indicators of international 
competitiveness. They weights are time-invariant. They have been computed for 
our twenty-one industrial countries by the IMF, and were created in October 
1994.
Thus, our trade-weighting scheme is:
18 By way of contrast, Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1996) do not control for fundamentals 
when testing for contagion.
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wij,t = EERij for any j ' i, where
EERij is the weight for country j in country i's IMF effective exchange rate 
index.
Our second weighting scheme is intended to capture macroeconomic 
similarities whose existence is a potential channel for contagion. We think of two 
countries as being "similar" if they display similar macroeconomic conditions — 
for example, if they have similar rates of growth of domestic credit. We then test 
the hypothesis that an attack on the currency of country j affects the probability of 
an attack on the currency of country i.
In practice, implementing this notion depends on being able to measure 
"similarity." We concentrate on seven "focus variables" that appear to be the 
subject of considerable attention among participants in foreign exchange markets: 
1) domestic credit growth (as always, relative to Germany); 2) money growth; 3) 
CPI inflation; 4) output growth; 5) the unemployment rate; 6) the current account 
(as always, in nominal GDP percentage points); and 7) the government budget 
deficit.20 We multiply the rate of GDP growth, the current account and the 
government budget by minus one in order to allow for easier comparison with the 
other four variables; this means that higher values are associated with greater 
risk. We standardize the variables by subtracting sample means and dividing the 
result by the sample standard deviation. In practice, we standardize in two ways: 
we take a country-specific approach in which a country is compared only with 
itself (so that, e g., the average rate of growth of French domestic credit is 
subtracted from the raw series and then divided by the sample French credit 
growth standard deviation; alternatively, we take a time-specific approach in 
which the observations at one point in time are compared with observations for 
all 20 countries at that same point in time. The first approach is appropriate if 
currency speculators compare credit growth in a country in a quarter to that 
country's own past credit growth; the second is relevant if speculators compare 
the country's credit growth to that typical of other countries in the same quarter.
Having standardized the variables, we compute the macro weights as follows 
for the "country-specific" and "time-specific" standardizations respectively:
wij,t = Sj (1 - {F[(x jt - mi)/si] - F[(x it - mi)/si]}) for any j ' i, and
wij,t = Sj (1 - {F[(x jt - mt)/s t] - F[(x it - mt)/st]}) for any j 1 i, where
F(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the standardized normal 
function, mi (mt) is the country-specific (time-specific) sample average of
20 One could imagine adding focus variables. The presence of capital controls and the total 
stock of external debt would be interesting, especially in the case of developing countries. 
However, such variables tend to move slowly. In addition, our seven focus variables turn out 





























































































variable x, si (st) is the country-specific (time-specific) standard deviation of 
variable x, and the x's are the seven macroeconomic "focus" variables.
This specification implies that if country j is attacked at tune t and it is similar 
to country i, in the sense of having similar standardized growth rates of relevant 
macroeconomic variables, then it receives a high weight on the contagion 
variable. If j and i have identical (standardized) domestic credit growth rates, the 
weight is unity; the more dissimilar are the growth rates (in the sense of being 
distant in terms of the cumulative distribution), the lower is the weight. If i’s 
credit growth is at the extreme lower-end of i's cumulative distribution while j's is 
at its upper end, then the weight is zero.
Since we have two standardizing techniques (country- and time-specific) and 
seven focus variables, we obtain fourteen sets of macroeconomic contagion 
weights.
B. Trade Weights
Table III substitutes our first set of weights - those based on the IMF's MERM 
weights and intended to capture bilateral trade linkages -- for the unweighted 
contagion variable.
Trade weighting the contagion variable improves the fit of the equation. In 
contrast to the unweighted results in Table I, however, it is not easy to interpret 
the size of the contagion variable, since this is no longer an indicator variable but 
is instead the product of a dummy and a trade weight. Nevertheless, the positive 
sign of the coefficient on the contagion variable indicates that an attack elsewhere 
in the world still increases the probability of a attack by a statistically 
significantly amount. The level of statistical significance for the contagion effect 
is higher than in Table I.
We interpret this evidence as supporting the hypothesis that currency crises 
are transmitted, at least in part, via bilateral trade ties. It leads us to the belief 
that there is contagion, rather than simply a shock to an unmeasured fundamental 
common to a number of countries.
C. Macro Weights
In Table IV we present results using the macro weights. We substitute all seven 
macro-weighted contagion variables for the trade-weighted measure.
The macro-weighted contagion proxies are generally insignificant at 
conventional statistical levels when considered individually.21 However, the 
seven variables are jointly significant at high confidence levels (the relevant chi-
31 This result does not depend on the conditioning set -- specifically, on whether the traditional 
political and macroeconomic fundamentals are entered only contemporaneously or with 
moving-average lags as well. It is also insensitive to whether the macro weights are computed 




























































































Harrv Eichengreen, Andrew Rose and ( 'harles Wyplosz
square test statistic, labeled "Contagion Test," is at the foot of the table). This 
suggests collinearity among the seven contagion variables, as one would expect.
Table V provides direct evidence on the extent of this collinearity. It reports 
coefficients on the macro-contagion variables when the latter are included in the 
equation one by one. (The coefficient estimates for the political and 
macroeconomic fundamentals are not reported for ease of presentation.) As 
expected, the estimated coefficients are positive, indicating that a currency crisis 
in a country which is similar, in the relevant macroeconomic sense, raises the 
probability of an attack on the domestic currency. The coefficients are 
statistically significant at standard confidence levels and do not vary much across 
macroeconomic focus variables, conditioning set, or standardization technique.
We interpret this evidence as consistent with the existence of macroeconomic 
contagion. But it answers only a subset of the relevant economic questions. For 
example, is contagion spread through both trade and macroeconomic links? Or 
does one channel dominate the other? We now proceed to these issues.
D. Comparing the Trade and Macro Channels
We are interested in testing the explanatory power of the different measures of 
contagion against each other. This requires dealing with the collinearity among 
our seven macro-contagion variables, for which purpose we employ factor 
analysis
Factor analysis both verifies the existence of multicollinearity and provides a 
convenient method of rank reduction. We estimated a single-factor model for the 
seven macro contagion variables using the method of principal factors. The 
single-factor model works well for both the country-specific and time-specific 
standardizations.22 We use the resulting factor — a linear combination of the 
seven macroeconomic variables — in place of the vector of standardized 
variables.22
Table VI reports estimates of the probit model when the effects of the 
different classes of contagion variables are estimated simultaneously. The three 
variables correspond to those used in Tables I, III and IV: they are unweighted, 
trade-weighted, and weighted by the macro factor, respectively. As always, the 
full set of political and macroeconomic controls is included.
Again there is overwhelming evidence consistent with contagion; a joint test 
of the hypothesis that all three contagion variables are significant, which appears
23 For instance, the first eigen-value is substantially higher than the second (for both the 
country-specific and time-specific factors, the first eigen-value is almost 6 while the second less 
than 0.2). in addition, the first factor explains a high proportion of the data variance (close to 
100%); the individual factor uniquenesses are low (never more than 30%). Finally, all the 
scoring coefficients are all positive, as expected.






























































































at the foot of the table, is wildly inconsistent with the null of no contagion The 
weighted measured designed to capture trade linkages remains positive and 
highly significant, consistent with contagion via the trade channel The 
unweighted measure is also positive and moderately significant at standard 
confidence levels, perhaps indicating that there is still evidence of a shock to 
unmeasured common fundamentals. But now the macro factor is negative and 
insignificant for all three conditioning sets and both standardization techniques.
Thus, our results suggest that contagious currency crises tend to spread across 
countries mainly as a function of international trade links. In contrast, the 
influence of macroeconomic similarities disappears when the various classes of 
contagion measures are included simultaneously. The continuing significance of 
the unweighted measure of contagion, even when the trade- and macro-weighted 
measures are included simultaneously, suggests that contagion may also spread 
through other channels than those which vve have emphasized.
E. Sensitivity Analysis
We have performed a number of robustness checks to investigate the sensitivity 
of our finding that trade linkages are more important than macroeconomic 
similarities. For instance, we split our sample into two parts (at e g., 1974 and 
1979) to check whether different models of contagion dominate different parts of 
the sample. We have split our sample into observations in which capital controls 
are present and absent. We have added additional macroeconomic fundamentals, 
and compared macroeconomic and trade contagion channels without our 
unweighted variable. None of these checks disturbs our basic finding that trade 
links are the more important conduit for the infectious spread of currency crises.
VI. Conclusion
We have reviewed the theoretical and empirical literatures on crises in foreign 
exchange markets with an eye toward the prevalence of contagion. While the 
possibility of contagious currency crises is a pressing policy issue, the debate 
surrounding it points up the limitations of existing research. The literature is 
replete with theoretical models highlighting the motives for and dynamics of 
speculative attacks on pegged currencies and potential channels of contagion, but 
empirical work has lagged behind. Stories of contagion abound, but systematic 
empirical analysis is lacking.
Here we have taken a first step toward such an analysis. Using data for 20 
industrial countries spanning more than three decades, a battery of empirical 
specifications fails to reject, at high levels of significance, the hypothesis of 
contagion. We find that a speculative attack elsewhere in the world increases the 
odds of an attack on the domestic currency. Without conditioning on the size or 
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currencies raise the probability of a domestic attack by eight per cent. But this 
does not disprove the hypothesis of common unobservable shocks, nor does it 
identify the channel(s) by which contagion is transmitted. Accordingly, we have 
also sought to test for contagion in foreign exchange markets using a framework 
that distinguishes two channels of international transmission of speculative 
attacks.
The first channel is trade links, and the hypothesis is that attacks spill over 
contagiously to other countries with which the subject country trades. The 
second channel is macroeconomic similarities, where the hypothesis is that 
attacks spread to other countries where economic policies and conditions are 
broadly similar. The first approach emphasizes the implications for 
competitiveness of an attack elsewhere in the world. The second focuses on the 
information content of an attack (where the assumption is that an attack on one 
country reveals information about market sentiment regarding the viability of a 
particular economic strategy).
Using data for 20 industrial countries spanning more than three decades, we 
have compared these alternatives. Both the trade-weighted contagion proxy and 
the macro-weighted proxy outperform the naive unweighted contagion measure 
when they are included one at a time. We take this as confirmation that what our 
tests are picking up is contagion per se, and not only the effects of omitted 
environmental factors common to the countries in question (although the latter are 
still present).
The effect of contagion operating through trade is stronger than that of 
contagion spreading as a result of macroeconomic similarities. When measures 
of both mechanisms are included in the specification, trade-related contagion 
dominate macro effect. Admittedly, similarities in macroeconomic policies and 
performance across countries are more difficult to capture in a weighting scheme 
than is the intensity of bilateral trade; the stronger showing of trade-related 
contagion may simply reflect our greater success in proxying this effect. At the 
same time, considerable experimentation with alternative measures of macro- 
related contagion, all of which points to the same conclusion, lends some support 
to our favored interpretation that it is trade links rather than macroeconomic 
similarities that have been the dominant channel for the contagious transmission 
in the sample period.
In the 1960s, toward the beginning of our sample, the debate over contagion 
centered on the industrial countries. The fear was that a currency crisis in one 
industrial country might destabilize the exchange rate pegs of the other advanced 
industrial nations. The fallout from the 1967 devaluation of sterling provides 
some retrospective justification for these fears (see Eichengreen, 1996). Today 
the debate over contagion increasingly focuses on emerging markets, in Latin 
America, Asia and elsewhere (e g., Sachs, Tomell and Velasco, 1996). The 





























































































undertake here more difficult for emerging markets. But it is clear that this 
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7 45 (3 8) 8.33 (4.0) 8.14 (4.3) 8.72 (4.0) 8 83 (3.8)
Capital
Controls
-1 66 (.7) .22 (.1) 6 6 (3 ) 4 8 (2 ) 1 24 (.4)
Government
Victory
-4.24 (1.0) -171 (.3) -6 0 (2 ) 5 30 (16) -.45 (.2)
Government
Loss
-3.45 (.9) -7.44 (1.3) -3.34 (1.2) 2.49 (.8) -.63 (.2)
Credit Growth 19(1.8) 11(8) .10(1.2) -.00 ( 0) -.09 (.4)
Inflation Rate .75 (3 5) .57 (2.4) .40(1.9) .59 (2.1) .64 (1.8)
Output Growth 21 (6 ) -.39(9) -.50(1.4) -74(1 .3) -3 6 (4 )
Employment
Growth
.37(7) .86 (1.5) .78(1.5) 1.08 (16) 1.30(1.6)
Unemploy­
ment Rate
.86 (3 .0) .96(3,2) .92 (3.5) 1.04 (3.3) 1.19(3.4)
Budget
Position/GDP
.47(1.9) .41 (1.6) .35(1.5) .46 (1.6) .57 (1.8)
Current
Account/GDP
-.23 (.8) -.36(1.1) -.51 (1.9) -.42(1.2) -.34 (8 )
Number of 
Observations
645 626 703 608 572
McFadden's R2 .15 .12 .13 .12 .10
Joint Test for 
Slopes (2(11)
55 46 53 43 36
Coefficients (P-value of Ho: Coefficient^)
Probit slope derivatives (xlOO, to convert into percentages) and associated z- 
statistics (for hypothesis of no effect).
Model estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood.














































































































9.38(3.5) 7.42 (3.3) 12.31 (2.8) 19.90 (3.4) 7 88 (2.9) 6 99 (3.4)
Capital
Controls
2.43 (1.1) -.50 (2 ) 5.41 (8) 10 05 (2 0) N/A 18(1)
Government
Victory
5.67 (2.0) 4 48 (.9) -9 52 (.8) 2 .22(3) -1 64 ( .2) -1 .13(2)
Government
Loss
-1.74 (.4) -1 9 0 (3 ) -14.57
(12)
-1 .57(3) -4 71 (.7) -6 60(1 2)
Credit Growth .09 (.8) .09 (6 ) .34(13) .13 (7 ) .22(1.2) 14(10)
Inflation Rate 26(1.4) 47(1.7) .17(4) .01 (0 ) .59(2.0) 58 (2 4)
Output Growth 19(8 ) -.07 (.1) -97(1.1) -.70 (9 ) -.68(1 2) - 40 ( 9)
Employment
Growth
1.27 (2.6) .52(8) -1 2 (1 ) 1 51 (1.1) .37 (5 ) 87(1 5)
Unemploy­
ment Rate
19 (8 ) .45 (14) 4 06 (3.0) 1.44 (1.7) .91 (2 4) .99 (3 2)
Budget
Position/GDP
0 5 (3 ) 47(1.7) 1.16(1 6) -.10 (3 ) ■ 38(1.1) 40(1 5)
Current
Account/GDP
-.47 (1.9) - 89(2.6) -1.48 (1.7) .08 (.2) -.23 (5 ) -36(1 .1)
Number of 
Observations
326 623 233 224 425 626
McFadden's R2 .32 .09 .17 .21 11 .12
Joint Test for 
Slopes(2(11)
55 36 31 28 28
45
Coefficients (P-value of Ho: Coefficient^)
Probit slope derivatives (xlOO, to convert into percentages) and associated z- 
statistics (for hypothesis of no effect).
Model estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood.
Slopes significantly different from zero at the .05 value are in bold.
All regressors are expressed as equally weighted moving averages of 
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Contem + 2 
Lags
MA of 2 
Lags
MA of 
Contem + 4 
Lags
MA of 




.44 (5.0) .66 (5.1) 61 (5.3) .72 (5.2) .74 (5.2)
Capital
Controls
-1 .8 (8 ) -.77 (.3) - 06 ( 0) -76  (.3) 16(1)
Government
Victory
-3.9 (.9) 59 (.1) 3 9 (1 ) 3.7(1.1) - 2 0 ( 7 )
Government
Loss
-2.0 (.5) -6.9 (1.1) -3.5 (1.2) 3 0 ( 9 ) 43 (.2)
Credit Growth 170 .6 ) .05(3) .09(1.1) - 0 9 ( 5 ) -1 0 ( 5 )
Inflation Rate .82 (3.8) .73 (3.0) .53 (2.6) .81 (2.8) .79 (2.3)
Output Growth 10(3 ) -3 9 (8 ) -.48(1.3) -.49 ( 8) -.21 (.3)
Employment
Growth
.44 (.8) .99(1.6) 95 (1.8) 1.12(1.7) 1.4 (1.6)
Unemploy Rate .71 (2.3) .78 (2.5) .76 (2.8) .85 (2.5) .97 (2.7)
Budget
Position/GDP
.52 (2.1) .49(1.8) .40(1.6) .58 (2.0) .71 (2.2)
Current
Account/GDP
-.28 (1.0) -.24 (8 ) -31 (1.1) - 33 (.9) -.21 (5 )
Number of 
Observations
645 626 703 608 572
McFadden’s R2 18 19 .19 19 18
Joint Test for 
Slopes c2(l 1)
70 70 76 67 63
Probit slope derivatives (xlOO, to convert into percentages) and associated z- 
statistics (for hypothesis of no effect).
Model estimated with a constant, by maximum likelihood.





























































































Country-Specific Averages Time-Specific Averages
Table IV: Probit Results with Contagion Variable
Weighted by Macro-Similarity
(All Seven Contagion Variables Included Simultaneously)
Contem­
poraneous














-.10 (0 ) 1.68 (.7) 2.72 (.9) -2.44 (.9) -1 0 ( 0 ) 01 (0 )
Crisis’ Money
Similarity
-3 2 ( 1 ) 1.06(4) - 38 (1 ) 41 (.2) .61 (.3) .12 (0 )
Crisis*Inflat
Similarity
2 54( 8) 4.12 (1.4) 5.24(1.5) 3 06(1 1) 4.02 (1.5) 5 93 (1.9)
Crisis’ GDP
Similarity
-1.97 (.8) -3.48 (1.5) -3.42(1.3) -1 0 6 (6 ) -2.57(1.6) -2.77(1.4)
Crisis*Unemp
Similarity
-.60 (3 ) -.93 (.6) -1 08 (.5) 3.35 (1.5) 3.66(1.8) 3.55 (14)
Crisis *C/Acc 
Similarity
2.10 (.7) 1.19(4) 1.72 (.5) 4.25 (1.7) 3.07(1.4) 3 59 (1.3)
Crisis*Budget
Similarity
1.80(8) 16(1) -.39 (2 ) -4 19(1.5) -4.86(1 9) -5.99 (2.0)
Cap Controls -2.56(1.1) - 43 (.2) -4 9 (2 ) -2.68 (1.1) -.64 (3 ) -.84 (3 )
Gov't Victory -3 81 (.9) -.05 (.0) -1.87 (.7) -3.52(8) -3 6 ( 1 ) -2.02 (.7)
Gov't Loss -2.62 (.6) -3.74(1.4) -1.03 (.4) -2.88 (.7) -3.99(1.4) -.99 (4 )
Credit ..20(1.7) .09(1.1) -1 6 (7 ) .22(1.9) 10(1.2) -1 8 ( 7 )
Inflation .80 (3.6) .48 (2.3) 81 (2.3) .71(3.1) .42 (2.0) .75 (2.1)
Growth .10(3 ) -.58 (1.6) -.46 (6 ) 15(4 ) -.58(1.6) - 38 (.5)
Employment .24 (.5) •57(1.1) 1.08(1.3) 2 0 (4 ) .67(1.3) 1 24(1.5)
Unemploy't 86(2.9) .92 (2.4) 1.16(3.2) .65 (2.0) .69 (2.4) .91 (2.4)
Budget/GDP .57(2.2) .37(1.5) .62(1 9) .33 (1.1) .20 (.8) .40(1.1)
C/Acc/GDP -.23 ( 8) -.46(1.7) -3 7 (9 ) -.08 (.3) -.29(1 1) -1 3 ( 3 )
NOBS 645 703 572 645 703 572
McFadden's R2 .16 .16 .14 .17 .17 .15
Slopes c2( 17) 63 64 49 65 67 53
Contagion Test 
c2(7)
20 27 25 21 28 27
Probit slope derivatives (xlOO, to convert into percentages) and associated z- 
statistics (for hypothesis of no effect). Model estimated with a constant, by 
maximum likelihood.
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Table V: Probit Results with Contagion Variable
Weighted by Macro-Similarity
(Contagion Variables Included One by One)
Country-Specific Averages Time-Specific Averages
Contem­
poraneous














6 67 (3.7) 7.46 (4.4) 8.82(4.1) 4.73 (2.7) 5.68 (3.4) 6.60 (3.2)
Crisis’ Money
Similarity
6.23 (3.8) 7.05 (4.4) 7.81 (3.8) 5.41 (3.3) 6.44 (4.0) 7.33 (3,7)
Crisis*Inflat
Similarity
7.17(4.1) 7.79 (4.7) 9.21 (4.4) 7.23 (4.2) 8.12(4 9) 9 81 (4.8)
Crisis*GDP
Similarity
6.03 (3.7) 5.74 (3.8) 6.84 (3,6) 5 41 (3.5) 4.81 (3.4) 5.90 (3.3)
Crisis*Unemp
Similarity
5.10(3.4) 5.25 (3.6) 5.82(3.2) 6 66 (4.3) 7.00 (4 8) 8 02 (4.5)
Crisis *C/Acc 
Similarity
7.35 (4.3) 7.53 (4.7) 8.91 (4.4) 7 40 (4.1) 7 26 (4 5) 9.05 (4 3)
Crisis*Budget
Similarity
6.15 (3.7) 5.78 (3.8) 6 13 (3.1) 5.13 (3.2) 5 40 (3 6) 5.87 (3.1)
Probit slope derivatives (xlOO, to convert into percentages) and associated z- 
statistics (for hypothesis of no effect).
Each model is estimated by maximum likelihood with a constant and seven 
political and macroeconomic controls.





























































































Tahle VI: Probit Results with Three Different Measures of Contagion
Country-Specific Averages Time-Specific Averages
Contem­
poraneous

























-.85 (.6) -1.87(1.3) -2.18(1.2) -.94 ( 7) -1.64 (1.2) -1.68 (1.0)
Capital
Controls
-1 .62(7) ■25(1) 32 (.1) -1 5 5 (7 ) .27 (1 ) ■ 29 ( .1)
Government
Victory
-3.70 (.9) .29 (.1) -1.60(6) -3.70 (.9) ■32(1) -1 5 7 (6 )
Government
Loss
-2.24 (.6) -3.32(1.1) .44 (.2) -2.23 (.5) -3.31 (1.2) .43 (2 )
Credit 17(16) .08(1.0) -.09 (.4) .17(1.7) ,09(1 0) - 09 (.4)
Inflation .77 (3.7) .47 (2.3) .72(2.1) 77(3 7) .48 (2.4) 74 (2.1)
Growth .09 (3 ) -53(1.5) - 35 ( 4) .09 (3 ) -52(1 .5) - 34 ( 4)___
Employment .39 ( 8) .93 (18) 1.29(1.6) .40 (8 ) 89(1 8) 1.25 (1 5)
Unemploy't .69 (2.4) .76 (2.9) .96 (2.7) .70(2.4) 78 (2.9) .98 (2.7)
Budget /GDP .48 (2 0) .37(1.6) .68 (2.1) .47 (2.0) 37(1.6) .67 (2.1)
Current
Account/GDP
- 23 (.9) - 33 (13) -.26 (.6) -.24 (9 ) -.36(1 4) -.29 (7 )
NOBS 645 703 572 645 703 572
McFadden's
R2
.20 .20 .19 .20 .20 19
Slopes c2(13) 75 81 66 74 81 66
Contagion 
Test c2(3)
31 38 34 31 37 33
Probit slope derivatives (xlOO, to convert into percentages) and associated z- 
statistics (for hypothesis of no effect). Model estimated with a constant, by 
maximum likelihood.
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